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In the United Stare1;' quite volatile public debates over the 
legalization ot voluntary active euthanasia and physician- 
assisted suicide, much has been made of the risk of abuse. 
Indeed, it was probably fears of abuse that contributed 
more than any other single factor to the 19 9 1  defeat of the 
United States’ first ballot test of legalizing euthanasia, the 
state of Washington’s Initiative r 19—despite prior state 
and national polls suggesting the measure would pass. 
Opponents of Initiative 1 1 9 , which would have legalized 
physician-performed euthanasia or physician-provided aid 
in suicide when voluntarily requested by competent termi­
nally ill patients with less than six months to live, variously 
claimed that the legislation would encourage greedy family 
members to pressure patients into choosing death, that 
unscrupulous physicians would kill patients who became 
unattractive to treat, that cost-cutting pressures from hos­
pitals, insurers, and other institutions would force patients 
into death, and that race-, age-, and handicap-prejudice 
would take an especial toll among vulnerable groups.
These risk-of-abuse arguments, also known as “slip­
pery slope” or “wedge" arguments, were often fortified 
with claims about abuse in the Netherlands, the one coun­
try which currently openly permits active euthanasia.
Nor has the discussion ceased with the defeat of Initia­
tive t s 9. On the contrary, many observers are predicting 
that euthanasia will become il)e social issue of the next 
decade. If so, claims about the possibilities of abuse are 
likely to continue to play a very major role. Nor are they 
trivial: most siippery-slope arguments predict abuse on a
quite broad scale, and the more flamboyant of them warn 
against complete moral holocaust.
While these warnings of abuse seem characteristically 
both alarmist and unclear, I think we must take them 
seriously—especially those of us who support legalization 
in the United States of both voluntary active euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide. This requires both the effort 
to discover what, in fact, is the predicted evil against which 
the warning is being delivered, and what is the likelihood 
that such an outcome will really come about. Do we fear 
that greedy family members will maneuver patients into 
choosing death? Exactly how, and how can we know 
whether this will come about? Do we think physicians will 
lose their scruples and begin to kill their patients? Why 
might they lose these scruples, exactly, and what were 
these scruples in the first place? Will wholesale “medical 
homicide” take place, as former Surgeon General Everett 
koop warned in TV spots broadcast in Washington on the 
eve of the 19 9 1  vote on Initiative t  r9 ? Will cost-conscious 
institutions force patients into euthanasia or into request­
ing means for suicide, and if so, precisely how? What 
forms will race-, age- and handicap-prejudice take in exac­
erbating this problem, and how will it be that members of 
such groups are especially victimized?
Some further protections against abuse have already 
been proposed. Undaunted by the defeat of Initiative 1 1 9  
in Washington, the Hemlock Society announced that it 
would introduce a similar initiative in California; it has 
already qualified for the November 1 9 9 1  ballot. The
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California Death with Dignity Act would legalize volun­
tary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide under 
the same circumstances as Washington’s Initiative 1 1 9 , but 
would impose additional protections—the patient’s re­
quest must be “enduring,” there are special protections for 
persons in skilled nursing facilities, there are prohibitions 
against intimidation, inducement and tampering, provi­
sions for psychological consultation and tor the indepen­
dence of physicians, stipulations that the time and place of 
death are to be determined solely by the patient, limita­
tions on fees, and record-keeping requirements; further­
more, the patient is encouraged to notify his or her family.' 
There have also been various other proposals in the public 
media for the addition of protections to legislation legaliz­
ing euthanasia and assisted suicide; one such set of sugges­
tions following 1 1 9 , for example, would have required 
that aid-in-dying be performed only in a hospital, that it be 
performed only within the context of an established doc­
tor-patient relationship, and that it be restricted to resi­
dents of the state of Washington.2 Another recommended 
that training in pain control and terminal care be made a 
condition for the renewal of M.D. licenses, implying that 
euthanasia and assisted suicide could be practiced without 
abuse only if physicians were fuliy skilled in techniques of 
treating patients' pain.5 A Dutch proposal offered early in 
that country’s discussions of euthanasia would have re­
quired an extensive autopsy and mortality review for every 
patient who died by euthanasia, comparing not only the 
physician’s diagnosis with pathologies found on examina­
tion of the cadaver but also reviewing the deliberations 
leading up to euthanasia.4 Whatever the various recom­
mendations for the addition of protections to any proposal 
for legalization, it is important not to treat them too 
lightly; on the contrary, it is crucial to try to see precisely 
what fears of abuse they attempt to respond to, and also 
how effective they might be in preventing or controlling 
such abuse. In general, I think it is crucial to be as clear and 
forthright about the issue of abuse as possible, even if one 
supports, as I do, the legalization of aid-in-dying.
In doing so, one must answer two central questions:
1 ) Will there be abuse, and if so, precisely what kind?
2 ) Can abuse of this sort be prevented?
It is to the second of these questions that I will be particu­
larly attentive here. In doing so, I shall consider only the 
possible effects of legalizing voluntary, active, physician- 
performed euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, re­
stricted to cases in which such help is requested by 
competent, terminally ill patients with less than 6 months to 
live—that is, I shall he considering only what Initiative 1 1 9  
would have legalized—but some of the arguments will 
clearly apply to a wider range of possible legislation as well.
Siippery-slope arguments are designed to address the 
first of the two questions above: Will there be abuse, and if
so, precisely what kind? Since they are predictive empirical 
arguments intended to show that permitting a given prac­
tice will result in abuse, the principal strategy available to 
counter these arguments is to show that they fail to specify 
what causal mechanisms will be involved, what back­
ground precedents would permit such erosion, and so on. 
Thus opponents of legalization warn of abuse in the future, 
pointing to alleged current abuse in the Netherlands as 
evidence; supporters of legalization, on the other hand, 
reply that claims about abuse in Holland are unsubstanti­
ated or exaggerated and that there is tittle reason to think 
abuse would occur in the United States. One cannot fear an 
analogue of the Nazi holocaust, supporters of the legisla­
tion argue, for example, because even though there are 
local excrescences of antisemitic, anti-Black, and other 
racially prejudiced political activity, it is inconceivable that 
a country with such strong guarantees of civil rights could 
permit a large-scale extermination program. Thus the ar­
gument moves back and forth between opponents and 
supporters, however erratically; but it remains an essen­
tially empirical argument about the potential consequences 
of legalization.
It is this argument which I would like to enter here. As 
I have often said elsewhere, I do not think there is any 
compelling argument in principle to be made against vol­
untary active euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, at 
least in specific circumstances, and I believe that on the 
contrary control of one’s own death as far as possible is a 
matter of fundamental human right. However, I also think 
that the warnings of potential abuse require much more 
sensitive and careful examination than either supporters or 
opponents of such legislation have generally given them. 
Indeed, I think it is morally responsible to advocate the 
legalization of euthanasia and assisted suicide only if one 
can conscientiously argue either that abuse would not 
occur or that it could be prevented, and it is on this project 
that I would like to embark here. Conversely, I also think 
it is morally responsible to oppose the legalization of 
euthanasia and assisted suicide, given the importance of 
the freedom to be suppressed, only if one can show with 
reasonable likelihood that abuse would occur and that it 
could not be prevented.
Thus either way, it is crucial to consider the issue of 
abuse, and this is an obligation that no party to the 
discussion, on either side, ought to evade; the burden of 
proof in establishing what the consequences of the pro­
posed legislation would be falls, in this special case, on 
both sides. That persons have a basic, fundamental right to 
control as much as they wish and as much as is possible the 
timing and circumstances of their own deaths is a claim 
that I shall assume here,5 but this assumption does not 
relieve us of the obligation to consider the risk of abuse. 
After all, if the risks of abuse are great enough, this may 
entail that even basic, fundamental rights of persons should
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he curtailed. It on the other hand the risks of abuse rum 
out to be small or if abuse enn be prevented, tlun it is 
mor.illv imperative that persons’ basic, fundamental right 
to control as much as possible the circumstances of their 
own dying be legally recognized.
Will abuse occur?
While euthanasia is presumably practiced clandestinely 
\ irtuully everywhere else, it is openly practiced only in the 
Netherlands. Thus our principal source of empirical infor­
mation about the potential for abuse where euthanasia is 
effectively legal must come from the Netherlands. To be 
sure, euthanasia is not fully Segal in the Netherlands; it 
remains a violation of statutory law, punishable in prin­
ciple by imprisonment, but the lower and supreme courts 
have developed a series of guidelines under which euthana­
sia is immune trom prosecution. Thus it is effectively legal 
and openly practiced, and it is supported by a substantia! 
majority of public opinion. Most Dutch hospitals now 
have protocols governing euthanasia, and m an y  health­
care institutions, including nursing homes and hospitals, 
also have developed publicly stated policies concerning 
whether they do or do not permit the practice.
The first nationwide stud\' in Holland on euthanasia 
and other medical decisions at the end of life, prepared 
by a commission appointed by the Dutch government 
( the so-called Remmelink Commission), involved detailed 
interviews with 4 0 s physicians trom different disciplines, 
a questionnaire mailed to the physicians of 7000  deceased 
persons, and a prospective survey in which physicians 
interviewed in part I gave information concerning every 
death m their practice (a total of 2.2.50 deaths) during the 
six months after the interview." This study found that 
about i .H percent of total deaths per year in the Nether­
lands are the result of euthanasia with some form of 
physician involvement and that about 0.3 percent of 
deaths involve physician-assisted suicide. But it also 
reported that in 0.8 percent of all deaths “drugs were 
administered with the explicit intention to shorten the 
patient’s Site, without the strict criteria for euthanasia 
being fulfilled,”' and it is this that has been widely inter­
preted in the United States to mean that 1000  patients 
were killed against their will. While this is a clear misin­
terpretation of the data in the Dutch study, fair treatment 
of the issue of abuse must take account of both actual 
and conjectural evidence from Holland.
Tlu re are several further matters co be remembered in 
addressing the issue of abuse. First, judgments about abuse 
should in principle be comparative, weighing influences on 
choice, ad|Listed for the seventy of outcome, against influ­
ences on other alternative choices. Would choices of eutha ­
nasia be more or less abused than, say, choices of high-risk 
surgeiy or choices ro withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment? After all, any of these choices can lead to death, 
not only choices about euthanasia. Furthermore, judg­
ments about abuse ought not to cloak judgments about 
outcomes: it cannot be assumed, without further argument, 
that—in the kind of case at issue here—influences 011 a 
choice for euthanasia are potentially abusive while influ­
ences on a choice to stay alive are not. It is also to be 
remembered that there is little theoretical agreement on just 
what constitutes abuse: is it a distortion of voluntariness, i.s 
it the violation of a person’s interests, or what?
Finally, it is important to remember that the issue of 
vv hether abuse would occur is an issue about the outcomes 
of policy, nor about idiosyncratic acts. In every society and 
with regard ro every kind of social policy, unstable, psycho­
pathic, or otherwise deranged individuals commit acts 
which clearly constitute abuses: nurses who randomly 
inject patients w ith fatal drugs, doctors who perform delib­
erately damaging, unwarranted operations on patients, 
anaesthetists who have sex with patients on their operating 
tables. Such outlier cases will occur trom time to time, 
regardless of the type of policies in effect. To be sure, one 
ought not be sanguine about the occurrence of such cases, 
bur the real issue is not so much whether such outlier cases 
will occur—they will, in any country, with or without 
legislation—but whether the legislation itself would permit 
or encourage such cases on a more frequent, more accepted, 
more “normal" basis. Thus, the question is whether the 
policies at issue—the legalization of active euthanasia and 
of assisted suicide—would engender an abusive pattern of 
practice, not whether a handful of isolated, marginal cases 
of abuse would occur from time to time. It is “normal” 
patterns of abuse that the slippery slope arguments are 
properly concerned with; Would family members readily 
and routine!} manipulate patients? Would physicians gen­
erally become callous about death? Would institutions 
regularly force patients into euthanasia or suicide in an 
effort to save costs? Would prejudice against racial, age, 
and handicapped groups further infect these practices?
While 1 have no doubt that some outlier cases of abuse 
would occur trom time to time, 1 do not think the general 
answer to these questions is yes. Nor do I think euthanasia 
choices would be more abused than choices of high-risk 
surgery or of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment. Nevertheless, I will assume the contrary tor 
purposes of this paper, since my real concern here is 
whether—if such abusive patterns might be tolerated or 
encouraged by legalizing euthanasia and suicide—there 
are effective ways of preventing abuse. This is not to 
assume that human nature is evil or that abuse is humanly 
inevitable; rather, it is to assume instead that different 
policies and the incentives and disincentives incorporated 
in policy can encourage or discourage quite dilferent pat­
terns of practice. Thus the question is, would the legaliza­
tion of euthanasia and suicide, with or without safeguards
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such as those proposed by Hemlock or those already in 
place in Holland, engender abuse? If so, what sort, and can 
such abuse be prevented even if it would otherwise occur?
Types o f possible abuse
Three conceptually distinct types o f abuse can be identified 
among the scenarios that slippery-slope arguments por­
tray: what we might call interpersonal abuse, professional 
abuse, and institutional abuse. Though they are conceptu­
ally distinct, we may expect that in practice they would 
often be closely intertwined. Although the parallels are not 
exact, they also invite three rather different sorts of solu­
tions, that is, three rather different sorts o f strategies for 
preventing such abuses from occurring.
1. Interpersonal abuse. Chief among the varieties o f inter­
personal abuse, one might expect, would be that occurring 
in familial situations: the resentful or greedy spouse or 
other family member, who maneuvers a terminally ill 
patient now perceived as a burden into requesting eutha­
nasia or assistance in suicide. Such pressures might be 
malevolent, the product of long years o f hostility; or, 
perhaps more likely, they might be the product of the kind 
o f emotional exhaustion familial caregivers often experi­
ence in attending to a patient with a lengthy, deteriorative 
terminal illness. ‘‘All of your suffering could be over soon,” 
such a family member might be expected to say— not 
seeing that much o f the suffering is not so much the 
patient’s but his or her own. Familial messages supporting 
euthanasia or suicide can o f course be given in an enor­
mous variety o f ways, both explicit and inexplicit, verbal 
and nonverbal, and they can be conveyed by a single 
individual family member or by a family as a whole.
Familial messages favoring euthanasia or suicide can 
be comparatively weak, involving suggestion or even the 
mere raising o f the idea; they can be stronger, including 
what we might variously call recommendation, urging, 
“ talking into,” pleading, cajoling, remonstrating, and so 
on; and they can be a great deal stronger, including such 
tactics as threats, ultimatums, lies, and so on. N ot all 
family life is harmonious, and underlying pathology can 
often be exacerbated by the stresses a family m em bers 
terminal illness brings. “ All right, Granny, it’ s time to g o ” 
is a message we can imagine being conveyed in a large 
variety o f ways, exhibiting an entire range from the faintest 
suggestion to outright coercion.
2.. Professional abuse. If family members will manipulate 
or pressure patients into choosing death in all the usual 
ways family members control each other’s behavior, it can 
be further argued, physicians will have an even larger 
range of methods for doing so. For instance, they may give 
inaccurate diagnoses or unreliable prognoses. They may 
scare patients with predictions o f pain. They may decline 
to offer adequate pain control, citing for example the risks
o f addiction to narcotic drugs, or offer only pain control 
which is sporadic or has undesirable side effects. They may 
refuse to offer other treatment which might produce sym p­
tom relief. They may “ recommend” premature death in 
ways that are too persuasive for the patient to resist, or 
they may recommend it to the family and let the family do 
the persuasion. Worse still, they may learn to lean on 
euthanasia as a kind of medical crutch, turning almost 
automatically to it as the solution for every treatment 
problem they cannot solve; even worse, they may use it as a 
cover for their medical mistakes. Perhaps still vvorse, they 
will become euthanasia “ enthusiasts,” employing euthana­
sia as part o f their own political programs for reforming 
the medical world.
To understand these claims, it is essential first to see 
what background assumptions make them plausible, given 
that it is only voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide 
that would be legalized, and then only for competent, 
terminally ill patients with less than 6 months to live. Yet 
even given the comparative narrowness of this range of 
cases, the dire predictions so widely voiced cannot be 
ignored. For this reason, it is crucial to understand w hat is 
distinctive about abuse by doctors, and to some degree by 
nurses and other care providers as well— that is, what is 
distinctive about professional abuse in contrast to interper­
sonal, usually familial, abuse o f the sort discussed above.
Professional abuse, understood as that range of ways 
in which professionals, especially physicians, might bring a 
patient to “ voluntarily” request euthanasia or help in 
suicide who would not otherwise do so, can exhibit most 
o f the features o f interpersonal, domestic abuse— sugges­
tion, urging, manipulation, and threat aimed at one person 
by another— but it incorporates an additional feature: the 
weight o f professional authority. It is the physician w ho 
holds the power in the physician/patient relationship, not 
only because the physician has greater knowledge o f the 
physiological processes affecting the patient and how to 
control them, and because the physician’s social aura con­
veys authoritative standing to his or her role, but also 
because the patient is ill. Especially when it is terminal, 
illness can place a person in a particularly compromised 
position; for many patients, illness involves discomfort and 
pain, anxiety, fear of impending loss of one’s relationships, 
and fear o f death. Thus “ professional authority” trades on 
two factors: the greater weight o f the physician and the 
compromised position o f the patient. Both factors invite 
abuse. The nurse may also be regarded as a medical au­
thority, particularly in situations (e.g., home care) where it 
is the nurse who is the primary' or only contact with the 
patient, but it is the physician whose capacity is greatest for 
exploiting professional authority.
Given this disparity of power in the physician/patient 
relationship, physicians are very well aware o f their power 
to influence patient choices— even while preserving the
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appearance of obtaining informed consent, t he I.atinate 
obscurity o f medical diagnosis and the overwhelming na­
ture of too much medical information often contribute to 
this possibility. Thus, many physicians claim they can get 
patients to agree to nearly anything they propose; it is 
simply a matter of how the choice is framed. Just as, in the 
traditional example, the glass o f water can be described as 
half empty or half full, a proposed surgical procedure with 
a 50/50 predicted outcome, for example, can be described 
as a probable success or a probable failure; a “ good 
chance” can mean anything from a 10  or 10  percent 
chance of success to 80 or 90 percent. Information can be 
orchestrated to emphasize benefits or to emphasize risks, 
even when information about both benefits and risks is 
actually provided. Presumably, thus, physicians would find 
it easy to frame choices about euthanasia or suicide in 
similar ways: unfavorably for patients whom they wanted 
to discourage, but favorably for those whom they hope to 
maneuver into this choice. Thus, even under legislation 
which protects only voluntary choice by competent pa­
tients, it is argued, the physician couid manipulate the 
patient into choosing death when the patient would not 
otherwise have chosen it or when it is actually contrary to 
his or her own wishes. In all these cases, the fiction that the 
patient has given informed consent can be preserved; what 
is problematic is the w ay in which the physician presents 
the information on which the patient’s choice is based.
There is a second way in which professional authority 
can play a substantial role in shaping patient choice. Much 
o f the interaction, as well as the legal support, for the 
relationship between physician and patient is based on 
assumptions of inform ed conscnt— that is, that the patient 
retains the right to give or withhold consent to treatment 
and that in making these choices the patient is entitled to 
adequate information about the alternatives involved. In­
formed consent must be explicitly documented for specific 
procedures, e.g. surgery; it is assumed for a wide range o f 
minor tests and procedures involved in medical care. But 
reliance on informed consent also reinforces power dispari­
ties in the physician/patient role and exacerbates the weight 
o f professional authority: in informed consent, it is the 
physician who proposes the specific course o f treatment 
and the patient who gets to say yes or no. But in this 
arrangement, it is the physician wrho identifies the problem, 
frames any suggested solution to it, and controls how many 
alternative solutions are proposed. The patient cannot 
know whether the problem could be seen in some other way 
or as some different sort of problem, whether other sorts of 
solutions couid be proposed, whether in making the choice 
to give or withhold consent he or she is making a choice 
among all the reasonable alternatives, and, sometimes, 
whether there really is any problem at all. The agenda is, so 
to speak, entirely in the control of the physician. This may 
of course be a reasonable arrangement for consent to
medical procedures which do not raise values dilemmas, 
but it is hardly a defensible arrangement in the case of 
euthanasia. Euthanasia is, after all, a quintessential “ val­
ues” issue: whether a person prefers a chance o f extended 
life in spite of suffering or pain, or whether he or she prefers 
an earlier, easier end to life in order to avoid suffering and 
pain. If consent to euthanasia is treated in the w ay consent 
to other medical procedures is, it will be the physician's 
agenda, not the patient’s, that is on the table for action, and 
to which the patient’s only option is to agree or disagree. 
Rut this, of course, is fertile ground for abuse.
Furthermore, the physician’s capacity to shape patient 
choice in euthanasia, both by selective control o f inform a­
tion and by initial formulation o f both the problem and the 
solution presented for consent, may be influenced not only 
by malevolent but also by paternalistic intentions. To be 
sure, there are physicians motivated by greed, prejudice, 
fear o f malpractice action for a medical mistake, and so on. 
But there may also be physicians who genuinely believe 
that euthanasia would be in the best interests of the pa­
tient, given the pain and suffering the physician knows 
otherwise lies in the patient’s future, and who thus may 
seek to influence patient choice in this direction for the 
patient's own sake. O f course, whether manipulation of 
the patient in what the physician perceives to be the 
patient’s own interest is to be counted as abuse depends in 
the end on theoretical issues about the nature o f paternal­
ism and whether abuse is defined as violation o f voluntary 
patient choice or as violation o f patient interests, but the 
possibility o f paternalistic manipulation o f the patient by 
the physician must at least be considered among the variet­
ies o f possible abuse.
3. Institutional abuse. Institutional abuse will no doubt 
include some o f the features of interpersonal abuse and 
also professional abuse, but it is again conceptually dis­
tinct in its central feature: it operates by narrowing the 
range o f actual choices open to the patient. It may seem to 
closely resemble those forms o f professional abuse in which 
the physician shapes the patient’s choice by selectively 
providing information or proposing one rather than an­
other possible course o f action for consent, but it functions 
in a distinct way: it erects barriers so that certain choices 
can be made only with difficulty or cannot be made at all. 
It is not only that choices are shaped, but, more impor­
tantly, that only certain choices are possible, while other 
choices are closed off. There need be nothing clandestine 
about this, as there may seem to be when the physician 
withholds specific information or selectively emphasizes 
some information in order to promote certain choices; in 
institutional abuse, in contrast with professional abuse, 
the policies in question are typically open and sometimes 
widely known, even though they may have manipulative 
or coercive consequences.
What are the fears, so vocally and variably expressed in
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the public discussions of euthanasia? They are fears about  
various sorts o f institutions: hospitals, nursing homes, 
insurance companies, the government. They are fears pri­
marily o f policies which are financially motivated, seeking 
to cut costs in medicine by offering less care, imposing 
barriers, and withdrawing certain options. They are fears 
that hospitals will not provide certain types o f care or will 
provide it only to some patients, that nursing homes will let 
the quality o f care and of institutional life deteriorate to the 
point where it is unbearable, that insurance companies will 
exclude from coverage many forms o f treatment and pallia­
tion which might benefit the patient, or that they will 
exclude some patients from coverage altogether. They are 
often fears about the government, usually fears of govern­
ment intrusion via restrictive policy development.
Furthermore, these fears o f what might occur were 
active euthanasia and assisted suicide to be legalized are 
rooted, it is evident, in current observations of what is 
perceived to constitute institutional abuse already, even 
though such abuse cannot now openly lead to choices of 
euthanasia and suicide. These are perceptions o f institu­
tional abuse in a health care system which is grossly 
inequitable and in which costs are out of control: a health 
care system in which many persons have no medical insur­
ance; in which medical insurance is often prohibitively 
expensive; in which some insurance policies are mislead­
ingly and seriously inadequate; in which insurance com pa­
nies proceed by “ cream skimming” and experience rating 
for risk avoidance, selecting for coverage persons whose 
health risks are good and refusing coverage to those whose 
health risks are not; in which both private and governmen­
tal insurers evade payment by delay and by nuisance re­
quirements concerning filing claims; in which coverage for 
some sorts o f patients (e.g., Medicaid) is so low that they 
become unattractive to providers; in which some sorts of 
facilities (e.g. rural and ghetto clinics) are closed or never 
provided; and in which the general degree o f evasion and 
virtual deception in public statements about health care is 
perceived to be high. Given the chaotic nature o f the 
current U.S. health care system, in contrast to the well- 
developed national health provider and insurance systems 
in place in other industrialized nations, it is reasonable to 
suppose that fears o f institutional abuse in the legalization 
of euthanasia will be higher here than in any of These other 
countries— and, indeed, with good reason.
Fears o f institutional abuse are further exacerbated by 
the fact that a very substantial portion o f health care 
expenses are spent in the last month, two months, six 
months o f life. But while it is possible to determine which 
the last month, two months, or six months o f life has been 
for a given patient only retroactively, this in general coin­
cides with the period in which a patient is understood to be 
terminal— and in which, under a statute like Initiative 1 1 9 ,  
active euthanasia or assistance in suicide would be legal.
Thus it is not just that the health care system is inequitable 
and chaotic, with costs spiralling wildly out of control, it is 
also that a very substantial portion o f these costs are 
directly associated with precisely those patients for whom 
euthanasia and assisted suicide would Erst become legally 
available . The shorter and easier a terminal course is, the 
cheaper it is to cover; and the cheapest patient o f all is one 
who chooses death now. This, o f course, is a particularly 
inviting occasion for institutional abuse.
To understand the pervasive possibilities o f institu­
tional abuse, we must also understand the various mecha­
nisms by which it operates. There are, I think, three primary 
mechanisms which wholly or partially close o ff choice: 
direct policy stipulations, indirect policy agendas, and the 
use of policies which control preference. The first o f these 
involves direct, usually overt and publicly announced 
policy stipulations or rules: for instance, policies or rules 
requiring the use of certain forms of treatment or prohibit­
ing the use of others, covering some but not all care, and so 
on. But some seemingly direct policies, overt and public, 
may also have indirect agendas; this is the second form of 
mechanism by which institutional abuse can take place. 
Several current examples come to mind, and though they 
cannot now lead to legally performed euthanasia or as­
sisted suicide, they represent the kind o f indirect-agenda 
policy one might also expect to see if euthanasia were legal. 
These include the development o f Diagnosis-Related 
Groups as a basis for Medicaid and Medicare reimburse­
ments to hospitals: while D R G ’s are officially formulated 
and were originally announced as “ averages” for care 
costs for specific disease classifications, they have become—  
quite predictably— ceilings. Similarly, the Patient Self-De­
termination Act, effective December 1 ,  19 9 1 , requires 
hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, home health agencies, 
health maintenance organizations, and other health care 
facilities which treat Medicaid or Medicare patients to 
inform patients at the time they are admitted of their right 
to make decisions concerning their own medical care, 
“ including the right to accept or refuse medical or surgical 
treatment and the right to formulate advanced directives” * 
by signing a Living Will or Durable Power of Attorney. 
These facilities must also ask incoming patients if they 
have already made an advanced directive. This legislation 
seems an impressive acknowledgement of patients’ rights 
to autonomy in health care. But it is already widely be­
lieved— predictably so— that the legislation does not sim­
ply require health care facilities to ask patients //they have 
Living Wills, but that it requires health care facilities to 
“ see to it” that patients have Living Wills. To bureaucratic 
entities concerned with controlling costs in terminal care, 
this cannot be an unwelcome misunderstanding.
Third, some policies have the effect o f making only 
some choices rational ones for a person in specific circum­
stances, even if other choices would be permitted. An
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example already in place, which might be thought to he 
particularly coercive if euthanasia or assisted suicide were 
legal, is the provision requiring spend-down for coverage 
by Medicaid: a person facing an extended period in a 
nursing home must exhaust virtually all his or her own 
funds before public assistance begins. For the person who 
is already terminally ill and who faces a choice between 
exhausting his or her legacy for a comparatively short 
period of additional life, versus leaving earlier but manag­
ing to leave one’s legacy behind for a spouse or for chil­
dren, this may not seem to be a choice at all, but a situation 
in which federal policies make the choice o f earlier death 
the only really rational one. And, of course, policies such as 
this may trigger various forms o f interpersonal abuse as 
well: the spouse who will be impoverished if the patient 
chooses to live, but left with a legacy if euthanasia is the 
choice, may be unable to resist innuendo, manipulation, or 
open coercion in the matter.
Protections against abuse
The picture o f possible abuse is a grim one, particularly in 
a society with a chaotic health care system, but it is, I 
think, a real risk. Yet 1 also think it is possible to erect 
protections against such abuse that can be both stable and 
effective. Such protections are nor foolproof, and the poli­
cies and regulations in which they are incorporated are 
not likely to stop those who operate outside the law in any 
case. Nevertheless, these protections are adequate, I be­
lieve, to prevent the kind of general, large-scale, “ normal” 
abuse that many forms of the slippery-slope argument 
predict, and thus render unwarranted the large-scale limi­
tation of patient choice that laws prohibiting euthanasia 
and assisted suicide represent.
These protections fall into three general categories—  
policies designed to protect the quality of the patient’s 
choice, policies designed to control professional and insti­
tutional distortions o f a patient’s situation, and policies 
designed to permit the development of objective indices of 
abuse. Though they are to be described separately here, 
they will function best, o f course, in concert and interac­
tively. Indeed, I think that all or nearly all o f the forms of 
protections described here will need to be in place to 
provide reliable prevention o f abuse.
Policies d es ig n ed  to p ro tect the q u a lity  o f  the 
p a tien t’s cho ice
Policies designed to protect the quality of the patient’s 
choice must attempt to look at two things: how the patient 
reached that choice, and what the content o f that choice is. 
Both raise enormous theoretical issues, requiring answers 
to two philosophically difficult questions, drawing on two 
distinct senses of the term "rational": what must one have
done to have made a “ well-chosen” or “ rational" choice? 
and what characteristics must the “ right” or “ best” choice, 
that is, the “ rational” choice, display? Nevertheless, we 
can intuitively discern choices that are badly made in the 
sense that they are the product o f irrational thinking, 
inadequate information, undue outside influence, and so 
on; and we can also discern choices that seem to be, given 
the interests and values o f the individual making them, 
simply bad choices for him or her to have made, regardless 
of how carefully they were considered. O f course, this 
raises enormous issues of paternalism, but we can never­
theless discern at least the broad outlines of “ badly m ade” 
and “ bad” choices. The two mechanisms discussed below 
attempt to protect the quality o f the patient’s decision in 
both these cases.
Psychological evaluation. Several proposals for amending 
the proposed aid-in-dying legislation recommend provi­
sions for offering or requiring a psychological evaluation 
of the patient who requests euthanasia or assistance in 
suicide. Generally, such evaluations would seek primarily 
ro identify psychopathology or other disturbances of rea­
soning, especially depression, which might affect the 
patient’s capacity to reach a fully voluntary, autonomous 
choice; they would thus be designed to protect the patient 
from choosing badly. Such evaluation might routinely use 
standard scales of depression, such as the Beck Inventory; 
it might also involve interviews by the physician involved 
or by a consulting physician, psychologist, or psychiatrist. 
Such evaluation should be conducted in private with the 
patient, aw ay from the influence of family members or 
other parties who might exert pressures of various subtle 
sorts. However, it cannot be too easily assumed that any 
evidence o f depression that could be detected in this way is 
grounds for rejecting a request for euthanasia or assistance 
in suicide; depression is a natural accompaniment o f termi­
nal illness, though more pronounced in some stages o f the 
dying process than in others, and terminal illness, while it 
may involve some gains in intimacy with one’s loved ones, 
is also a period of continuing loss. The routine use of 
psychological evaluation adapted for other situations, es­
pecially to detect depression, ought not to impose a higher 
standard for decision-making than for other important 
decisions in life; instead, it ought to be used just to identify 
the clearest cases of transient, reversible depression which 
may be affecting patient choice. Thus, psychological evalu­
ation measures used in these situations— for persons diag­
nosed as terminally ill, with less than six months to 
live— must be redesigned so that the expression of thoughts 
about death, considerations of suicide, or the wish to die is 
not interpreted as prim a facie evidence of depression and 
so taken to preclude voluntary choice.
Cnurtsc’li) i%. As least until recently, most counseling avail­
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able in the U.S. has been committed to the principle of 
suicide prevention, and would view any expression o f a 
wish or intention to die as grounds for further treatment. 
In this sense, most counseling has been directive: it has 
been concerned to direct clients or patients towards life- 
affirming choices and constructive ways of resolving their 
problems, aw ay from death. Furthermore, perhaps as a 
result o f the Tarasoff decision, most psychologists have 
understood themselves to be obligated to report serious 
potential harm to third parties or to the patient, and hence 
obligated to take action (for instance by initiating involun­
tary commitment) with respect to a patient who reports a 
serious intention to commit suicide. In a large range of 
cases, these postures are entirely appropriate. But they are 
not appropriate in the circumstances at issue in terminal 
illness, especially if the patient has a legally protected right 
to euthanasia or assistance in suicide; here, what is in order 
instead is genuinely nondirective counseling, designed to 
help the patient discover whether his or her request for 
euthanasia or assistance in suicide is in fact a genuine one, 
carefully thought through, fully understood, and in keep­
ing with his or her most basic values— that is, whether it is 
the “ right” or “ best” or “ rational” choice fo r  this person. 
O f course the request might be a “ cry for help” or the 
product of external manipulation or other abuse, but it 
might also be a genuine product of the person’s most 
considered, reflective choice. Any counseling offered ought 
to serve solely to differentiate these two, not to close o ff 
one set o f options; if not, it is useless in these situations. 
Suicide-prevention centers and crisis hotlines have, 1 have 
argued elsewhere, been particularly remiss in failing to 
serve that proportion of the population who may find their 
services most valuable: persons considering suicide (or 
euthanasia) as a w ay o f responding to the prospect of 
deteriorative terminal illness, as well as those with severe 
permanent disabilities or advanced old age.lJ Such persons, 
who take themselves to be considering a rational response 
to difficult circumstances, cannot avail themselves o f ser­
vices whose announced purpose, “ suicide prevention,” 
makes it clear that they will work to preclude such a 
choice, or of services whose policies require initiating in­
voluntary commitment for persons viewed as likely to 
commit suicide. Rather, what is needed is counseling de­
signed to help a patient think through the issues in “ ratio­
nal suicide,” including requests for assistance or for 
physician-performed euthanasia. Such suicide-neutral 
counseling takes the request at face value and seeks to help 
the patient be sure he or she has considered all conse­
quences, acknowledged his or her own emotions, and 
recognized all conflicts or affirmations o f value such a 
choice might involve.10 Indeed, such counseling may well 
serve to reduce the psychopathology o f such situations by 
allowing more open discussion o f them; but it cannot do so 
if it is committed to pre-shaping choice.
Continuity requirem ent or waiting period. Some proposals 
have suggested that a waiting period be required between 
the initial request for euthanasia or assistance in suicide 
and the provision of these services. The clear intent behind 
such proposals is to ensure that the choice is stable and 
enduring, rather than a fleeting, transitory response to a 
new setback, and hence that it is an expression o f the 
patient’s true, underlying values. Other mechanisms which 
might be said to provide concrete evidence of the patient’s 
values at earlier periods in life would include such instru­
ments as a Living Will executed before the onset o f the 
terminal illness or at an earlier point during it; some courts 
have considered records of or testimony about earlier 
comments made by the patient concerning other persons in 
similar circumstances. While a short waiting period (say, 
2,4 or 48 hours) may serve as some protection against 
impetuous decision-making, longer waiting periods (say, a 
month or two) are not only artificial but have the potential 
to be cruel, since they postpone that very relief the patient 
is seeking. Paradoxically, waiting periods may also encour­
age some patients to make premature requests as a w ay of 
getting into the queue early. Living Wills and Durable 
Power o f Attorney documents need not be signed under 
controlled circumstances, and it is sometimes argued that 
they do not reliably represent a patient’s true choices over 
time, especially since the patient may be unable to correctly 
anticipate his or her future situation. Despite the deficien­
cies o f waiting periods and advance directives, neverthe­
less, some form o f protective device designed to ensure 
both the stability o f the choice and its consonance with the 
patient’s own values seems appropriate— provided, of 
course, that it does not completely preclude any possibility 
for the patient to change his or her mind. Notice what is 
not recommended here as a protective device: the delibera­
tions o f a committee. These can only be deliberations 
about the content o f the patient’s choice, not the patient’s 
voluntariness in making that choice, and I do not see that a 
committee decision on whether the patient may or may not 
end his or her life protects the quality o f the patient’s 
choice. M ore likely, it serves to protect the institution in 
which the committee is based.
Policies designed to protect against professional and 
institutional distortion o f a patient's choices
The sorts o f policies considered in this section are designed 
to prevent both intentional and inadvertent distortion o f a 
patient’s situation and hence a patient’s choices by either 
the physician or other health care providers or by institu­
tions, including hospitals, nursing homes, home care agen­
cies, insurance companies, and governmental agencies.
Prohibition o f  fees. In remarks published before the vote on 
Initiative 1 19 , Professor Albert Jonsen warned of a “ flood
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of persons” who would travel to Washington in order to 
seek euthanasia. Other voices warned of the development 
of “ death houses” or “ euthanasia clinics,”  clearly drawing 
on the analogy with abortion clinics, and some suggested 
that unscrupulous physicians would offer inducements to 
patients to seek such services, perhaps by advertising in the 
public or medical media. Remote as these predictions might 
seem to be, there is a simple way to prevent such traffic and 
the institutional stimulation ot such traffic: no physician or 
other health care provider should be permitted to charge a 
fee for performing euthanasia or for providing assistance in 
suicide, or at least no fee beyond minimal compensation for 
the time actually involved. Advertising such services, at 
least in any way more elaborate than announcing their 
availability, should also be prohibited. Euthanasia is not a 
complex procedure, if reliable information is available to 
the physician about methods for performing it (as would 
presumably be the case if the procedure were legalized), 
though it may be performed in comparatively slowr ways 
that do involve extended time. At least some physicians in 
the Netherlands, where euthanasia is in effect legal and 
where medical information about methods to be used is 
widely available, report that they do not accept fees, even 
though the procedure may be performed in a hospital or in 
a home, and even [hough, at the request of the patient, the 
procedure is often performed in a way that involves a long, 
slow induction of sleep followed by coma over a period of 
several hours, usually to make the transition from life to 
death easier for the family to watch. Dutch physicians 
report that they expect to remain with the patient (and the 
family) throughout this time, though they do not take tees 
for it."  Similarly, to prohibit health care facilities from 
advertising and from charging fees for euthanasia or any 
closely related ancillary services, or from charging fees that 
would provide a profit over expenses, would preclude at 
least some incentives for euthanasia and for the develop­
ment of a euthanasia “ trade” or market.
Documentation. A  second form of protection against abuse 
involves extensive documentation o f ativ procedure in­
volving euthanasia or the provision o f assistance in suicide. 
Such documentation, presumably to be a part o f the 
patient’s medical record, would include the medical his­
tory, the prognosis, the nature o f the current problem(s), 
the reasons for the patient’s request (both the patient’s 
stated reasons and the physician’s perceptions o f the 
patient’s reasons, if different), and a record of the 
physician's discussions with the patient’s family, if any. 
Also to be included in the documentation is a clear expres­
sion of the patient’s choice: not merely a signed “ informed 
consent” to the procedure itself, but documentation o f the 
patient’s active request. This might of course take many 
forms— a letter, a tape-recording ot the patient’s voice, or 
witnessed statements by observers— but the central ele­
ment here is documentation of the fact that euthanasia or 
assistance in suicide is the patient’s idea, not that o f the 
physician, the family, or the health-care facility.
As a second, equally important component, the docu­
mentation should also include a record of treatment alter­
natives discussed with the patient, including treatment 
alternatives refused by the patient as well as those ac­
cepted, forms of pain relief or symptom control offered the 
patient, and, also equally important, any forms of treat­
ment potentially effective for the patient’s condition but 
excluded from coverage by insurance policies, by the health 
care facility’s care priorities, by governmental rationing 
policies, and so on. Thus these three elements o f documen­
tation serve to reflect interpersonal, professional, and insti­
tutional abuse respectively.
Reporting. The performance of euthanasia or the provi­
sion of assistance in suicide should also be reportable to an 
appropriate external agency. At the moment, of course, 
there is no such designated agency, but a number of possi­
bilities suggest themselves: for instance, the coroner (since 
presumably the cause o f death, euthanasia, perhaps to­
gether with the disease causing the terminal condition, 
would be entered on the death certificate), or the Centers 
for Disease Control (as a keeper o f mortality statistics), or 
the National Institutes o f Health (as a federal research 
agency), or Health and Human Services (as the highest 
level o f federal bureaucracy for health issues), etc. H o w ­
ever, the natural analog to the Dutch reporting require­
ment would not be immediately plausible in the U.S.; in the 
Netherlands, because euthanasia is technically a violation 
o f statutory law and the guidelines developed in lower and 
supreme court cases serve as a defense to prosecutions for 
homicide, the physician is obligated to report any occasion 
o f euthanasia to the Ministry of Justice after the fact, 
where it is reviewed and prosecution undertaken if the 
guidelines are not met. (As is well known, only a small 
proportion o f Dutch physicians has been doing so, though 
this number has been increasing in recent years.) However, 
it in the United States euthanasia and assistance in suicide 
were legal under statutory law, reporting to the Depart­
ment of Justice or state-level judicial authorities would not 
seem immediately plausible, since technically, no crime 
would have been committed; perhaps, however, a report­
ing requirement could be inserted in the authorizing law. 
Whatever the agency to which report is made, what is 
important in preventing abuse is that detailed information 
about cases of euthanasia be available for review; the 
effectiveness o f this structure would clearly also be en­
hanced by a substantial penalty for not reporting.
Indices of abuse. Documentation and reporting of eutha­
nasia cases makes possible what is perhaps the most im­
portant mechanism for the control of abuse and the reliable
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provision of protection to patients. What is central here is 
the possibility o f retroactive inspection on a broad scale of 
patterns o f performance o f euthanasia. As in current analy­
ses by John Wennberg at Dartmouth and others o f geo­
graphical variation in surgical procedures and other 
statistical assessments o f medical practice, the performance 
o f euthanasia and assistance in suicide, if documented and 
reported, would also be open to objective review. Review, 
ot course, could be made at all levels and for all factors 
reported: by individual physician, by health care facility, 
by insurance carrier, by type of terminal condition, by 
length o f association between patient and physician, by 
types of pain control and symptom palliation provided, by 
types o f alternative treatment denied, by age, race, gender, 
handicap status, and so on. Thus many quite revealing 
questions could readily be answered: Do some doctors 
provide assistance in suicide more frequently than others? 
Do the patients o f some nursing homes request euthanasia 
more frequently than the patients o f others? Are patients 
covered by some health insurance plans more frequently 
denied care for certain sorts o f conditions, and are these 
denials listed among their reasons for choosing euthana­
sia? H ow  often are spend-down provisions among the 
reasons for such choices? Do black patients “ choose" 
euthanasia more often than white? Patients with poor 
educations or lower incomes more often than patients with 
privileged backgrounds? While such data might not al­
ways be easy to interpret, physicians who had become 
euthanasia enthusiasts, nursing homes providing deliber­
ately intolerable care, and insurance companies forcing 
patients into euthanasia choices by refusing to cover cer­
tain sorts of care could be tentatively identified, and further 
examination of specific situations then conducted by the 
appropriate review organizations.
Furthermore, not only would analyses o f such data 
reveal patterns o f euthanasia practice and hence probable 
patterns o f euthanasia abuse, but there is already some 
basis for comparative analysis o f such data. The new 
Remmelink Commission study from the Netherlands pro­
vides the first objective glimpse of euthanasia practice in a 
climate in which it is widely accepted and in which it is 
legally tolerated: it is now known, as we saw earlier, that 
about 1.8  percent o f all deaths in the Netherlands are the 
product o f euthanasia and that about 0.03 percent of all 
deaths involve physician-assisted suicide. Additional infor­
mation about these patients is also available: for example, 
their average age at the time o f euthanasia (62 for men, 68 
for women; interestingly, Dutch physicians report very few 
requests from older patients); their regional location (more 
in urban areas); and the approximate amount of life for­
gone (in 70 percent o f cases, more than one week; in 8 
percent, more than six months}. Information is also avail­
able about the reasons for their requests o f euthanasia: loss 
o f dignit>r (mentioned in 57 percent of cases), pain {46
percent), “ unworthy dying” (46 percent), being dependent 
on others (33 percent), and tiredness of life (23 percent). 
According to this study, in just over 5 percent o f cases was 
pain the only reason. Furthermore, about two-thirds o f 
initial requests for euthanasia do not end up as a serious 
and persistent request at a later stage of the disease, and of 
the serious and persistent requests, about two-thirds do nor 
result in euthanasia or assisted suicide since, according to 
the study, physicians can often offer alternatives.11
Information of this sort would provide an initial basis 
for comparison of U.S. experience with a country in which 
two relevant characteristics are different. First, the Nether­
lands is a country in which the practice o f euthanasia is 
widely and generally accepted, both by patients and by 
physicians; thus, it is a country in which the incidence of 
euthanasia is, presumably, not distorted by severe social 
discouragement. Second, it is a country in which the prac­
tice of euthanasia is uncoerced by financial considerations 
on the part o f the patient (the Netherlands has an effective 
national health insurance system which provides all resi­
dents with extensive care in the hospital, nursing home, 
and at home); thus, it is a country in which patient choice is 
not constricted in at least one w ay common in the U.S. 
Thus, the Dutch experience can provide tentative expecta­
tions about what our own experience might be were eutha­
nasia accepted and were it not affected by financial 
considerations; though o f course this is a highly conjectural 
strategy, examining the practices in the Netherlands can at 
least initially provide very rough, informal guidelines for 
scrutinizing our own practice. If we suppose for example 
that, despite differences between Dutch and American 
culture, somewhere around 1.8  percent is the “ norm al” 
percentage o f persons dying who would choose to do so by 
euthanasia when that alternative is socially accepted and 
when it is not coerced by financial considerations, and that 
a tiny additional fraction would choose physician-assisted 
suicide, we then have an easy measure for suspecting abuse 
in our own society. Are, say, 10  or 20 percent o f terminally 
ill Medicaid patients choosing suicide, but not such a high 
number o f privately insured patients? Thirty or 40 percent 
of the uninsured? About one-fourth o f Dutch AID S pa­
tients die by euthanasia; is the proportion higher among 
AIDS patients here? Is “ pain” the reason for which a large 
proportion of patients are said to have chosen euthanasia? 
Since this is the primary reason for only 5 percent o f Dutch 
patients choosing euthanasia, we might well suspect foul 
play— or its medical and bureaucratic variations, like de­
liberate neglect or refusal to provide adequate symptom 
control— if the rates in the U.S. were much higher. O f 
course, these figures can hardly be treated as rigid norms, 
and certainly not as either quotas or ceilings; but they can 
give us some idea of what we might expect were we to 
permit the practice here, and what would be wildly out of 
bounds. This is not to assume that the Dutch have got it
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right, so to speak, and that abuse never occurs in the 
Netherlands; but inasmuch as there is no documented 
evidence that abuse is occurring (other than very rare 
“ outlier” cases), it is reasonable to begin with Dutch expe­
rience as a guide to what, it ail went well, vve might expect 
in the U.S. T o  be sure, these proportions might change as 
social attitudes change, and would no doubt increase if 
acceptance tor self-determination in dying were to grow; 
they may o f course also change in the Netherlands. And 
these proportions would o f course change dramatically if 
Robert Kastenbaum’s well-known prediction were to come 
true, that suicide will become the preferred  mode of dying 
because it enables a person to control the time, place, and 
circumstances o f doing so. Thus statistical analysis cannot 
by itself identify patterns of abuse without some further 
analysis of social values and trends; but it is nevertheless 
adapted to identify variations in pattern within a culture 
and across institutional and geographic lines. What the 
data from the Netherlands now tel! us is that we should 
expect that euthanasia would be quite infrequent— less 
than 2. percent of all deaths— and that the reasons for 
which patients choose it do not have to do only with pain. 
O f the various mechanisms for protecting against abuse, it 
is the possibility of potential public exposure, incurring the 
risk o f further legal action, that provides the most sccure 
protection, provided o f course the penalties for not report­
ing are substantia! as well. It is true that many of the 
slippery-slope arguments warn of abuse on a vast scale, but 
they forget that we can easily put in place expert methods 
for detecting and thus preventing it.
As I said earlier, I think it is the moral responsibility of 
those who favor legislation to show how abuse can be 
prevented; I also think it is the moral responsibility o f those 
who oppose legalization to try to show that abuse will 
occur and that it can be prevented in no other w ay. The 
burden of proof in this immensely important, sensitive 
area falls on both sides, and neither side can be certain of 
its predictions about the future. However, the present does 
provide us with a good deal o f evidence for thinking clearly 
and specifically about just what sorts of abuse we might 
expect and what sorts o f abuse can be prevented, and I 
think the weight o f the argument falls in favor o f recogniz­
ing patients’ rights to self-determination: even if abuse 
might otherwise occur, there are sophisticated, effective 
ways to prevent it, and the right in question is too funda­
mental to suppress without compelling reason. I have no 
doubt but that abuse could occur; in fact, all the forms of 
potential abuse elaborated here already occur in our cur­
rent choices about death— that is, in choices of withhold­
ing and withdrawing treatment, the only forms of control 
over death legally permitted in the United States. Because 
these sorts of choices about death are less conspicuous 
than choices about euthanasia and assisted suicide, they 
are less subject to review and control via the various 
mechanisms identified here. Indeed, I think the open, legal 
practice of voluntary active euthanasia and physician-as­
sisted suicide will have not only the morally important 
effect of leading to recognition of a wider range of what I 
believe to be fundamental rights, but, insofar as it will 
require us to erect protections against abuse, the practice of 
euthanasia will also prod us to develop much stronger 
protections for the kinds of choices about death we already 
make in what are often quite casual, cavalier ways.
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